The Internet of Things (IoT) will be formed by smart objects and services interacting autonomously and in real-time. Recently, Alcaide et al. proposed a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications. Their system is set up by an ad-hoc community of decentralized founding nodes. Nodes can interact, being participants of cyberphysical systems, preserving full anonymity. In this study, we point out that their protocol is insecure. The adversary can cheat the data collectors by impersonating a legitimate user.
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) will be formed by smart objects and services interacting autonomously and in real-time. Recently, Alcaide et al. [1] proposed a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications. Their system is set up by an ad-hoc community of decentralized founding nodes. Nodes can interact, being participants of cyberphysical systems, preserving full anonymity.
In Alcaide et al.'s protocol, two roles are defined for participant nodes: Users and Data Collectors. Users are the nodes originating the data. They can anonymously and unlinkably authenticate themselves in front of data collectors proving possession of a valid Anonymous Access Credential (AAC) encoding a particular set of attributes. Data collectors are entities responsible for the collection of data from authorized users. Therefore, before collecting the data, the data collector must verify that the user holds a valid AAC encoding a particular set of attributes.
The main characteristics of their protocol are:
• The protocol does not rely on any central organization.
• The users of the system jointly generate and distribute a private key that is used in a (t, n)-threshold fashion. This allows up to t nodes to be compromised without the key being compromised.
• Users of the system can obtain an AAC encoding a set of certified attributes and use such an AAC to anonymously and unlinkably authenticate themselves to data collector entities.
• Data collectors can anonymously authenticate users by means of attribute-based boolean formulas, which can be defined and modified by the data collector itself at any time.
Without loss of generality, their protocol is described assuming that users are authenticated based on only two attributes (x 1 , x 2 ), which can be derived from a standard certificatẽ x signed by some trusted external entity (i.e., a certification authority). In the protocol, once verified, the attributes (x 1 , x 2 ) will be encoded into an AAC so that the user can prove possession of those attributes without disclosing their actual value.
Any linear boolean formula (or a conjunction of formulas) can be used to anonymously authenticate users as legitimate participants. Such a formula can be represented as the function Φ R (x 1 , x 2 ). As mentioned before, users can prove that the attributes x 1 and x 2 , encoded in a AAC, satisfy Φ R (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 without revealing the actual attribute values.
In this study, we point out that their protocol is insecure. The adversary can cheat the data collectors by impersonating a legitimate user.
Alcaide et al.'s Protocol
Their protocol consists of three phases: Set-Up (where all parameters are generated), User Registration (users obtain AAC) and Credential Proving (users prove possession of a valid AAC to a data collector).
Set-Up
In this phase, a community of n users, {U i : i = 1, · · · , n}, known as founders, comes together to generate all protocol parameters. As a result of this phase, each founder U i holds two tuples:
• a public tuple:
equal for all founders.
• a private tuple:
are generated by the founders in a joint and decentralized manner, where
(mod ϕ(N )) and N = 4p 1 p 2 + 2p 1 + 2p 2 + 1 such that (p 1 , p 2 ) are Sophie Germain primes. q is a prime picked by a super node such that N |(q − 1). (e, g, c, h 1 , · · · , h 6 ) are picked by the super node randomly and broadcasted to the founders.
are also broadcasted by the super node so that every founder holds them.
At the end of this phase, the founders have computed the necessary cryptographic material to create AACs for valid data holders later on.
The detail of this phase which has nothing to do with our attack is omitted here.
User Registration
In this phase, a new user U new , holding a valid certificatex, obtains the necessary material from (t + 1) founders to construct its own Anonymous Access Credential AAC new , a token that encodes U new 's attributes (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ Z e and allows U new to anonymously and unlinkably prove to the data collector to be a legitimate participant. Before U new can participate in the system, it needs to obtain the protocol public parameters. In order to do that, U new simply requests the tuple P ub i from some founder U i and makes P ub new = P ub i .
The process that U new must follow to construct AAC new is described as follows.
• U new picks x 3 ∈ R Z * e such that gcd(x 3 , ε) = 1 and x ∈ R Z * N , and then computes a ′ = g • After receiving (x, a ′ , b), each founder U i verifiesx and extracts the attributes (x 1 , x 2 ) fromx. Then, it computes a = g
2 a ′ (mod N ) and m = (a + b) (mod N ). Furthermore, it signs m with its private tuple P riv i and sends σ i (m) to U new .
• After receiving (t + 1) partial signatures σ i (m) from the founders, U new generates the signature v = σ(m). Then, it computes a = g AAC new must be kept secretly at all times, only randomized versions of it will be used in the Credential Proving phase. It should be noted that U new must show its certificate to the founders.
Credential Proving
When a user U interacts with a data collector R, U must anonymously and unlinkably prove to R that it holds the appropriate attributes to satisfy the boolean formula Φ R that R uses to authenticate legitimate participants.
As the process that U must follow to accomplish such a proof is the key part of the anonymous credential system. Each of the sub-processes is given as follows.
1. Session values and commitments: every time that U wants to authenticate to the data collector R, U must generate and commit a set of session values, which are secret random values used during a particular authentication operation. This process is given as follows.
(a) U picks y ∈ R Z e , and then computeŝ
Then, it picks w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ∈ Z N and computes In order to authenticate U, every operation that R performs at the end of each ZKPoK must succeed. Whatever data R collects from U must follow these authentication subprocess.
• ZKPoK1: The objective of this ZKPoK is to prove that the private attributes (x 1 , x 2 ) that U holds in its AAC satisfy the boolean formula Φ R (x 1 , x 2 ). Note that Φ R can be any linear boolean formula; however, for simplicity reasons, as an example, the authors use:
α, β being chosen by data collector R. Consequently, U must prove, in a zero-knowledge manner, possession of AAC encoding attributes (x 1 , x 2 ) such that αx 1 + β = x 2 . This ZKPoK is given as follows.
-U picks r ′ y , r ′ 1 , r ′ 3 ∈ R Z e and r ′ ∈ R Z * N , then computes and sends
3 r ′ e (mod N ) to R.
-R picks and responds γ ∈ R Z 2 t to U.
3 s ′ e (mod N ) holds.
• ZKPoK2: The goal of this ZKPoK is to prove that all session value commitments generated by U are valid. For that matter, U must prove, in a zero-knowledge manner, knowledge of the secret tuple (y,â,b,m). This ZKPoK is given as follows.
(mod q) to R. -R picks and responds γ ∈ R Z q to U.
is sent to R, we correct this typo by replacing it with (s
• ZKPoK3: The objective of this ZKPoK is to prove that the signature v encoded in U's AAC is valid. In order to do that, U proves, in a zero-knowledge manner, knowledge of the ε-th root of the h 1 -part, which is equivalent to proving thatv is the ε-th root ofm. This ZKPoK given below must be executed L times.
it computes and sends t
-R picks and responds γ ∈ R {0, 1} to U. -U preforms as follows.
If
If γ = 0, it checks whether the equation
• ZKPoK4: The goal of this ZKPoK is to prove that U knows the session value y involved in ZKPoK1 -3. For that matter, U must prove, in a zero-knowledge manner, knowledge of the discrete logarithm with base g of the h 5 -part. This ZKPoK given below must be executed L times.
6 (mod q) to R. (In the original paper, g ′ is used to compute t ′ , we correct this typo by replacing it with g.) -R picks and responds γ ∈ R {0, 1} to U. -U preforms as follows.
-R performs as follows.
6 (mod q) holds. (In the original paper, g ′ is used in the equation, we correct this typo by replacing it with g.)
Note that, if and only if the authentication of user U succeeds (i.e., all ZKPoK1 -4 are successful), the data collector R collects data from U.
Cryptanalysis
In this section, we present an attack to point out that an adversary A can cheat the data collector by impersonating a legitimate user. In our attack, A needs not compromise user nodes.
It should be noted that if and only if A processes all ZKPoK1-4 with a data collector R successfully, A can cheat R into collecting data from it.
Suppose that the public parameters are (N, ε,
, and R's data collection policy is the equation
In the Credential Proving phase, the adversary A interacts with R anonymously and unlinkably as follows.
Session values and commitments:
A picks y ∈ R Z e ,v, a ∈ R Z * N and w, w 1 , w 3 ∈ R Z N . Then, it computes
A sends and commits the session values (â,m,b,c) to R.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge(ZKPoKs):
once A has committed its session values, A and R engage in ZKPoK1-4 as follows.
• ZKPoK1:
3 (mod N ). Then, it sends t ′ to R. After receiving γ from R, A computes s ′ = a γ (mod N ), and then sends (
Hence, ZKPoK1 is preformed successfully.
Hence, ZKPoK4 is preformed successfully.
Since all ZKPoK1-4 are successful, R authenticates the adversary A as a legitimate user, and then collects data from it. Hence, the protocol is broken. 2
Another main flaw of Alcaide et al.'s protocol is given below.
In User Registration phase, since the new user U new sends its certificatex in plaintext to the founders,x can be captured by A. Then, A sends (x, a ′ , b) to the founders by impersonating U new , where a ′ and b are computed by A itself. Since the founders are user nodes, it is reasonable to assume that they are stateless. Hence, they do not know whether x belongs to a user who has already received its AAC. So A can obtain (t + 1) partial signatures from the founders, then it can construct a valid AAC. That is, once a user's certificate is sent in plaintext in User Registration phase, the adversary A can obtain this certificate and forge a valid AAC by impersonating this user. With this AAC, A can cheat the data collectors in Credentail Proving phase. 2
Conclusion
Recently, Alcaide et al. proposed a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications. Their system is set up by an ad-hoc community of decentralized founding nodes. Nodes can interact, being participants of cyberphysical systems, preserving full anonymity. In this study, we point out that their protocol is insecure. The adversary can cheat the data collectors by impersonating a legitimate user.
